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Abstract According to A. N. Prior the use of temporal logic makes it possible
to obtain a clear understanding of the consequences of accepting the doctrines of
indeterminism and free choice. Nuel Belnap is one of the most important writers
who have contributed to the further exploration of the tense-logical systems as seen
in the tradition after Prior. In some of his early papers Prior suggested the idea of
the true future. Obviously, this idea corresponds to an important notion defended by
classical writers such as William of Ockham and Luis de Molina. Belnap and others
have considered this traditional idea introducing the term, “the thin red line” (TRL),
arguing that this idea is rather problematic. In this paper I argue that it is possible
to respond to the challenges from Belnap and others in a reasonable manner. It is
demonstrated that it is in fact possible to establish a consistent TRL theory. In fact, it
turns out that there several such theories which may all be said to support the classical
idea of a true future defended by Ockham and Molina.
The Prior Collection at Bodleian Library in Oxford contains a few letters from Nuel
Belnap to A. N. Prior and a few letters from Prior in reply—all from the period from
1960 to 1962. From the content of these letters it is evident that the two scholars shared
a deep interest in philosophical logic. They both greatly appreciated the beauty of
logical structures; in particular, they were interested in modal logic. For a new edition
of his Formal logic Prior wanted to include some biographical data of some of the
logicians he quoted in the book, and in a letter he asked Belnap to help him providing
some data for that purpose. Prior received the data from Belnap, and in reply he wrote
dated 28 March, 1960, he stated: “1930 seems to have been a good year for modal
logic—you, Smiley, Lemmon, Jonathan Bennett …”.
Clearly, modal logic attracted several brilliant young logicians during the 1950s and
the 1960s. Prior, himself, had worked a lot with modal logic during the 1950s. More
and more, these activities came to be combined with his interest in temporal logic
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and in the discussions regarding determinism and indeterminism. One of his main
interests had to do with the Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus and the search
for the so-called Diodorean modality (Prior 1955). It was well-known that Diodorus
had formulated his argument about 300 BC in order to demonstrate that the world
is deterministic, and to argue for a reductive account of modal notions to temporal
notions; specifically that possibility should be conceived as “what is or what is going
to be” (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, p. 15 ff; Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2006). To Prior this
gave rise to three interesting questions:
1. What is the formal structure of the modal logic in which possibility is defined in
the Diodorean way, on the assumption that time is a linear and discrete sequence
of instants?
2. How can a formal and valid version the Master Argument of Diodorus be formu-
lated?
3. How can indeterminism be defended (in terms of tense-logical systems consistent
with the assumption of free choice) against the valid versions of the Diodorean
argument and similar arguments?
Prior worked intensively with these and similar questions from 1953 to his death
in 1969. In doing so he found it most useful to study the theories of temporal logic.
According to Prior the use of temporal logic would make it possible to obtain a
better understanding of the consequences of accepting the idea of free choice. In
particular, he also realized that the notion of branching time could be most helpful
in this respect.
Question 1 above was fully answered during Prior’s lifetime. In fact, Prior ded-
icated a complete chapter of his Past, Present and Future to this problem and its
solution (see Prior 1967, p. 20 ff.). As we shall see, the study of this question ac-
tually led to the construction of the first branching time models. Prior’s work with
question 2 led him to the formulation of a reconstruction of the Master Argument
(see Prior 1967, p. 32 ff.). Working with question 3, Prior developed some very im-
portant systems of temporal logic consistent with the assumption of free choice. In
this chapter we shall mainly comment on his Ockhamistic system.
When Prior died in 1969 many additional problems regarding temporal logic and
indeterminism had been discovered. Since then several logicians and philosophers
have continued Prior’s line of thinking. Clearly, Nuel Belnap is one of the most
important writers who have contributed to the further exploration of tense-logical
approach to the study of indeterminism and free action.
Much of Nuel Belnap’s work has been carried out within a Priorean tradition.
As we shall see Belnap has elaborated the Priorean view that, although we may
formulate a so-called prima facie kind truth of contingent futures, such statements
cannot be what Belnap has called “settled true”. Belnap has described this inspiration
from Arthur Prior in the following way:
Although I suppose it is unscholarly, I have always thought that what I formulate using
“settled” is indeed what he “meant”, and what he “would have said” had he been aware of
the mischief that could, alas, be caused by not making “settled” explicit. [Personal commu-
nication, 31 Oct., 2009].
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Branching time
In his book Time and Modality (1957), Prior suggested that the modal logic of the
Diodorean concept of possibility (and time) is simply the modal system, S4. One of
the first readers to react on Prior’s book, was Saul Kripke who was only 17 years old
when he wrote the following to Prior:
I have been reading your book Time and Modality with considerable interest. The interpre-
tations and discussions of modality contained in your lectures are indeed very fruitful and
interesting. There is, however an error in the book which ought to be pointed out, if you have
not learned of it already [Letter from Saul Kripke to A. N. Prior, dated Sept. 3, 1958, The
Prior Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford; see Ploug and Øhrstrøm 2011].
Young Saul Kripke then continued his letter by explaining that the formula,
♦p ∨ ♦∼p
can be verified using Prior’s representation of Diodorean time as discrete sequences,
but that this formula can be shown not to be provable in S4. In this way Kripke
made an important contribution to the search for an axiomatic system corresponding
to the Diodorean notion of modality. This research engaged several researchers in
the late 1950s and the early 1960s. (See Prior 1967, p. 176). Even more important
was the following passage from Saul Kripke’s letter in which he suggested how the
semantics of S4 could be visualized. Kripke’s formulation of this very original idea
in the letter makes it reasonable to classify the occurrence of this letter as one of the
most important events in the history of logic during the twentieth century. Kripke
wrote:
I have in fact obtained this infinite matrix on the basis of my own investigations on semantical
completeness theorems for quantified extensions of S4 (with or without the Barcan axiom).
However, I shall present it here from the point of view of your “tensed” interpretation.
(I myself was working with ordinary modal logic.) The matrix seems related to the “inde-
terminism” discussed in your last chapters, although it probably cannot be identified with
it. Now in an indetermined system, we perhaps should not regard time as a linear series, as
you have done. Given the present moment, there are several possibilities for what the next
moment may be like—and for each possible next moment, there are several possibilities for
the next moment after that. Thus the situation takes the form, not of a linear sequence, but
of a “tree” (Fig. 1):
Saul Kripke explains this branching time model in the following way:
The point 0 (or origin) is the present, and the points 1, 2, and 3 (of rank 2) are the possibilities
for the next moment. If the point 1 actually does come to pass, 4, 5, and 6 are its possible
successors, and so on. The whole tree then represents the entire set of possibilities for present
and future; and every point determines a subtree consisting of its own present and future.
Now if we let a tree sequence attach not three (as above) but a denumerable infinity of points
to every point on the tree, we have a characteristic matrix for S4. An element of the matrix
is a tree, with either 1 or 3 occupying each point; the designated tree contains only l’s. If all
points on the proper ‘subtree’ determined by a point on the tree p are 1’s, the corresponding
point on Lp is a 1; otherwise, it is a 3. (In other words, a proposition is considered “necessary”
if and only if it is and definitely always will be the case.) [Letter from Saul Kripke to A.N.
Prior, dated Sept. 3, 1958, The Prior Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford]; (see Ploug and
Øhrstrøm 2011).
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Fig. 1 The branching time model suggested by Saul Kripke
Here ‘1’ stands for ‘true’ or ‘true proposition’, and ‘3’ stands for ‘false’ or ‘false
proposition’. ‘L’ stands for the necessity operator.
In this way Saul Kripke argued that S4 corresponds to a branching time system
combined with the Diodorean notion of temporal modality. This is the first ever
presentation of branching time as a logical system. This was clearly recognised by
Prior, who in his book Past, Present and Future discussed what he called “Kripke’s
branching time matrix for S4” (Prior 1967, p. 27). However, there are some obvious
shortcomings of Kripke’s semantics for predictions, i.e. that ‘it will be p’ and ‘it is
possible that it will be that p’ are indistinguishable because Kripke keeps the semantic
clause from linear time. This observation may have been an important part of Prior’s
motivation in his further development of branching time models.
Prior seems to have hesitated a bit in embracing the idea of branching time. This
probably has to do with the so-called ‘B-like’ properties of the system (mainly the
properties of the before-after relation). Prior clearly wanted a so-called A-theoretic
approach to time (i.e. a view of time based on the tenses: past, present and future).
On the other hand, he found that the crucial A-theoretical notion of free choice could
be represented in terms of branching time in a very clear and convincing manner. In
his later further elaboration of branching time Nuel Belnap strongly emphasized the
possibility of explaining what indeterminism is using this approach to time. Belnap
and Green stated:
Branching time is not itself an indeterministic theory; instead, it says what indeterminism is,
and it says what determinism is, but branching time does not choose between them (Belnap
and Green 1994, p. 370).
When it comes to branching time, Belnap takes a clear stand. He argues that what he
calls “Our World” can in fact be conceived as a branching time system, (see Belnap
and Green 1994, pp. 370, 371 and 386). According to Belnap it is essential that the
choices are real, i.e., that the world contains what he calls real possibility. For this
reason, he argues that one should reject the idea suggested by David Lewis, according
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to which the possibilities should be seen as parallel lines (and not as branching lines).
According to Belnap, such a view is misleading because it does not represent the
possibilities available to the free agents as belonging to reality (see Belnap 2007).
In his further development of the idea of branching time, Prior found great in-
spiration in the study of medieval philosophy. In particular, he found the works of
William of Ockham (c. 1285–1347) interesting. The central theme in the medieval
discussions regarding temporal logic was the apparent conflict between the doctrines
of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Can man be free if God already now
knows with certainty what the person in question is going to choose? Ockham wrote
a famous book, Tractatus de praedestinatione et de futuris contingentibus, on the
subject, which exists in a modern translation and edition by Marilyn McCord Adams
and Norman Kretzmann [1969]. In the book Ockham asserted that God knows all
future contingents, but he also maintained that human beings can freely choose be-
tween alternative possibilities. He argued that the doctrines of divine foreknowledge
and human freedom are in fact compatible.
Prior’s study of Ockham’s writings was a great inspiration when he formulated
his formal ideas on branching time. Clearly, it should be kept in mind that Ockham
himself had no formal language at his disposal. Prior had to transform Ockham’s
ideas into a modern context. Alex Malpass has edited the hitherto unpublished paper
by Prior, Postulate Sets for Tense Logic [Forthcoming], which is kept in the Prior
Collection at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. This paper was written and circulated in
the mid-60s, and is probably a draft of Prior (1966) paper Postulates for Tense Logic
and chapter VII.4 of Past, Present and Future (1967). The paper is the earliest known
example of Prior’s attempts at formulating a branching theory of his own. In the paper
Prior presents what he calls “an Occamist model”, which he used to formulate an
account of the future tense that was more acceptable to Ockham’s philosophical
views on future contingents than Kripke’s simple semantics. (In his early writing
Prior seems to have used the spelling ‘Occam’, whereas he used ‘Ockham’ in his
later writings.)
In these models the course of time (in a rather broad sense of this phrase) is represented by a
line which, as it moves from left to right (past to future), continually divides into branches,
so that from any given point on the diagram there is a unique route backwards (to the left; to
the past) but a variety of routes forwards (to the right; to the future). In each model there is a
single designated point, representing the actual present moment; and in an Occamist model
there is a single designated line (taking one only of the possible forward routes at each fork),
which might be picked out in red, representing the actual course of events (Prior 2014).
In his 1966 paper, Prior suggested two versions of the Occamist model, O and O′.
In both of them he assumed a designated route. He wrote:
In each O and O′ model there is a single designated route from left to right, taking one
direction only at each fork. This represents the actual course of events (1966, p. 157).
This idea of the true future as a single designated line is an idea which is now seen
as rather controversial within the discussion of branching time models. Prior made a
formal distinction between A-variables which stand for “those propositions which it
is now beyond our power to make true or false” (so-called) and other propositional
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variables. Using this distinction and the notion of branching time, Prior showed
how actual assignments of truth values at a point in the model and various so-called
prima facie assignments could be introduced. He presented the first three steps in the
procedure in the following way:
(1) Each A-variable is arbitrarily assigned an actual truth-value at each point, and
this is its only prima facie assignment at that point.
(2) A prima facie assignment to Fn at a point x will give it the value assigned to 
at the distance n along some path to the right of x (where the diagram forks within
this distance, Fn will have a number of different prima facie assignments at x).
(3) An actual assignment to Fn at x gives it the value of  at the distance n to the
right along the designated line.
In the paper, Prior illustrates his definitions by the following simple model:
It should be noted that Prior in his book Past, Present and Future dropped the
use of the idea of “an actual assignment” and concentrated on a definition of the
Ockhamistic model in terms prima facie assignments only, although no surviving
explanation from Prior exists which explains why he dropped the notion. As I have
argued in [1981], William of Ockham would not be an Ockhamist in this Priorean
sense. However, the theorems of the two Priorean and Ockham-like systems will be
the same, and the Ockhamist system defined in Past, Present and Future is certainly
interesting (see Reynolds 2003).
Prior’s Ockhamistic system suggested in Prior (1967, p. 126 ff). may be presented
in terms of the following recursive definition (see Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2011):
(a) Ock(m, c, p) = 1 iff TRUE(p, m) = 1, where p is any propositional constant.
(b) Ock(m, c, p∧ q) = 1 iff both Ock(m, c, p) = 1 and Ock(m, c, q) = 1
(c) Ock(m, c,∼p) = 1 iff not Ock(m, c, p) = 1
(d) Ock(m, c, Fp) = 1 iff Ock(m′, c, p) = 1 for some m′ ∈ c with m < m′
(e) Ock(m, c, Pp) = 1 iff Ock(m′, c, p ) = 1 for some m′ ∈ c with m′ < m
(f) Ock(m, c, ♦p) = 1 iff Ock(m, c′, p) = 1 for some c′ ∈ C(m)
Here TRUE is a function, which gives a truth-value (0 or 1) for any propositional
constant at any moment m in the branching time structure, (TIME, ≤). What Prior
called lines or routes, i.e. the maximal linearly ordered subsets in (TIME, ≤), are
often now called chronicles. We shall use this term in the following. C(m) is defined
as the set of chronicles through the moment of time m, i.e., C(m) = {c ∈ C |m ∈ c},
where C is the set of all chronicles in (TIME, ≤).
Strictly speaking, (a)–(f) only explain when Ock has the value 1 (‘true’). It should
be added, that the value is 0 (‘false’), if it does not follow from the recursive definition
above that is 1.
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Ock (m, c, p) = 1 can be read ‘p is true at m in the chronicle c’. A formula p
is said to be Ockham-valid if and only if Ock(m, c, p) = 1 for any t in any c in
any branching time structure, (TIME, ≤) and any valuation function TRUE. Here C
should not be taken as an independent parameter. Furthermore, it should be noted
that relative to a single chronicle, (a)–(e) are exactly the same definitions as those
used in linear tense-logic (i.e. the tense-logic which follows if (TIME,≤) is a linear
structure).
We define the dual operators, H, G, and  in the usual manner as ∼P∼,∼F∼,
and ∼♦∼ respectively.
Obviously, there is no designated line (Thin Red Line) in Prior’s Ockhamistic
system from Past, Present and Future, as there were in the two earlier versions of
the system mentioned above. If we wish to have such a feature, it has to be added
explicitly.
In their 1994 paper, Belnap and Green introduced the term “the Thin Red Line”
with reference to an idea very much similar to Prior’s “designated line, picked out
in red”. The term suggested by Belnap and Green was not inspired by Prior’s earlier
notion. (Belnap apparently never received a copy of Prior’s Postulate Sets for Tense
Logic, and he was not aware of Prior’s use of the expression [Personal communica-
tion, 25 April, 2012].)
Belnap’s and Green’s term was inspired by a report from the Crimean War in The
London Times: “The Russians dashed on towards that thin red-line streak tipped with
a line of steel.” It has even been suggested that the thin red line should in fact be
conceived as infrared indicating “that the Thin Red Line does not imply that mortals
are capable of seeing the future” (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 139).
Belnap and his co-workers have presented several arguments against the idea
of “the thin red line” and the use of this idea in branching time semantics. In the
following, we shall consider some of these arguments and discuss to what extent the
idea can be defended. I shall refer to William of Ockham as a main spokesman for
the view that the thin red line is important for the proper understanding of temporal
reality. In addition I shall refer to the works of Luis de Molina (1535–1600), who
much later than Ockham defended an even more elaborated version of the notion of
“the thin red line” (see Craig 1988, p. 175). In both cases the notion was presented
in terms of the Christian doctrine of divine foreknowledge. It should, however, be
pointed out that this view does not have to be linked to a theological framework.
Everything which will be said in favour of the idea of the thin red line can be
translated into a secular language.
1 There is No Truth Concerning Future Contingents
Nuel Belnap has maintained that “the Thin Red Line” is in no way part of the real
world. Before a free choice the alternative possibilities are equally real. There is no
designated future if the choice is free. Nobody could know what is going to be freely
chosen before the choice has actually been made. In his own words:
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There is no real choice without the reality of alternative possible choices facing the agent.
Each of these possibilities is, before the moment of choice, as real as any other. It is true
and important that at most one of these possibilities will be realized. It is equally true
and equally important that none of these possibilities is a ghostly image of some specially
distinguished one among them that some philosopher might label “the actual choice”. This
form of actualism is a bad idea (Belnap 2001, p. 2).
It seems that Belnap assumes that “a ghostly image” of “the actual choice” is
needed in order to make it true that a certain free agent is going to carry out a certain
act. However, as Trenton Merricks (2007) has argued the need for truth-makers in
order to establish the truth of propositions can certainly be questioned. As Merricks
has shown we may alternative hold that being true is a primitive monadic property
(2007: 170 ff.) It is, on the other hand, probably true that medieval logicians would
have a view closer to what Belnap is criticising as their metaphysical reasoning for
believing in “the thin red line”.
It is not difficult to imagine how William of Ockham would have replied to Bel-
nap’s criticism. He would probably have pointed out that Belnap’s position should
be accepted as long as we are dealing with human cognition alone. However, there
might be a deeper structure in reality which is not directly accessible to the human
mind, but which nevertheless is useful for a deeper understanding of natural language
and common sense reasoning. As a believer, Ockham stated his view referring to di-
vine foreknowledge. He willingly admitted that this idea is very hard to understand
for a human being. However, he attempted to clarify the issue as much as possible.
Ockham stated:
… the divine essence is an intuitive cognition that is so perfect, so clear, that it is an evident
cognition of all things past and future, so that it knows which part of a contradiction [involving
such things] is true and which part is false (Ockham 1969, p.50).
Ockham had to admit that much of this cannot be stated in a very clear manner. In
fact, he maintained that it is impossible to express clearly the way in which God
knows future contingents. He also had to conclude that in general the divine knowl-
edge about the contingent future is inaccessible. God is able to communicate the
truth about the future to us, but if God reveals the truth about the future by means
of unconditional statements, the future statements cannot be contingent anymore.
Hence, God’s unconditional foreknowledge regarding future contingents is in prin-
ciple not revealed, whereas conditionals can be communicated to the prophets. Even
so, that part of divine foreknowledge about future contingents which is not revealed
must also be considered as true according to Ockham.
Ockham was aware that the concept of communication was essential to this
discussion—especially, of course, the communication coming from God to human
beings. He claimed that God can communicate the truth about the future to us. Nev-
ertheless, according to Ockham divine knowledge regarding future contingents does
not imply that they are necessary. As an example Ockham considered the prophecy
of Jonah: “Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown” [The Book of Jonah ch.
3 v. 4]. This prophecy was a communication from God about the future. Therefore,
it might seem to follow that when this prophecy had been proclaimed the future de-
struction of Nineveh would be necessary. But Ockham did not accept that. Instead,
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he made room for human freedom in the face of true prophecies by assuming that “all
prophecies about future contingents were conditionals” (Ockham 1969, p. 44). So
according to Ockham we must understand the prophecy of Jonah as presupposing the
condition “unless the citizens of Nineveh repent”. Obviously, this is in fact exactly
how the citizens of Nineveh understood the statement of Jonah!
Ockham realised that the revelation of the future by means of an unconditional
statement, communicated from God to the prophet, is incompatible with the contin-
gency of the prophecy. If God reveals the future by means of unconditional state-
ments, then the future is inevitable, since the divine revelation must be true. Such
possible restrictions on the use of divine communication (revelation) must be taken
into consideration, if the belief in divine foreknowledge is to be compatible with the
belief in the freedom of human actions.
When translated into a secular language this means that if there is a designated
future, which is invisible to human agents, it will not destroy their freedom of choice.
In terms of Belnap’s notions: If the thin red line is in fact part of reality, then it has
to be “infrared” in the sense that it is undetectably to human beings, given that
free choice is also part of reality. However, this is not surprising. There are many
aspects of reality which we are ready to accept although they are even in principle
not verifiable. One such aspect is in fact free choice itself and its rooting the human
mind!
2 A Thin Red Line Theory is Insufficient as a Background
for a Proper Understanding of the Structure of Tenses
in Natural Language
The typical argument given in favour of the assumption of a designated future is that
we may in this way deal better with natural language and common sense reasoning.
However, it has been argued that this assumption is quite insufficient as a background
for a satisfactory model fit for dealing with the logic of tenses in natural language.
The Thin Red Line is supposed to help, but perhaps it does not.
Nuel Belnap and Mitchell Green have given a very nice example in support of
this criticism of a “Thin Red Line” theory:
The coin will come up heads. It is possible, though that it will come up tails, and then later it
will come up tails again (though at this moment it could come up heads), and then, inevitably,
still later it will come up tails yet again (Belnap and Green 1994, p. 379).
Clearly, this example calls for the use of so-called embedded tenses. It is not
sufficient to be able to refer to what is actually going to be the case, but we should
also be able to discuss what in alternative (counterfactual) situations would have
been going to happen. A designated future, it seems, is not enough.
Belnap and Green’s statement may be represented in terms of tense logic with τ
representing tails and η heads, respectively:
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Fig. 2 A branching time
model representing an
example suggested by Nuel
Belnap and Mitchell Green
F(1)η ∧ ♦F(1)(τ ∧ ♦F(1)η ∧ F(1)(τ ∧ F(1)τ ))
The problem for a Thin Red Line theory in evaluating this proposition is how to
understand the embedded occurrences of the F-operator. One way to do this is by
using the following branching time structure, which has been enriched with arrows
indicating not only a single designated future, but actually a designated future at
every branching point in the system (Fig. 2):
The example shows that if the model is taken seriously, then there must be a
function TRL, which gives the true future for any moment of time, m. More precisely,
TRL(m) yields the linear past as well as the true future of m, extended to a maximal
set. In this way, TRL(m) will for any moment of time, m, be a chronicle within the
branching time system.
It is very likely that William of Ockham would have accepted the points made
by Belnap and Green regarding embedded tenses. When analysing the features of
the Ockhamistic model, it becomes evident that within the model there must be a
true future, not only in every actual situation or instant, but also in every possible
situation. This was at least realised by Luis de Molina, who worked some centuries
after Ockham, but still very much in the same scholastic tradition. Molina’s special
contribution is the idea of (God’s) middle knowledge, “by which, in virtue of the
most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each free will, He saw in His own
essence what each such will would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in
this or that or indeed in infinitely many orders of things — even though it would really
be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite” (quoted from Craig 1988, p. 175). Craig
goes on to explain it as follows: “… whereas by His natural knowledge God knows
that, say, Peter when placed in a certain set of circumstances could either betray
Christ or not betray Christ, being free to do either under identical circumstances,
by His middle knowledge God knows what Peter would do if placed under those
circumstances” (Craig 1988, p. 175). Craig has argued that such counterfactuals of
freedom can be true even if there is nothing to make it true and no grounding of
such truth. On the contrary, the truth of counterfactuals of freedom might be taken as
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Fig. 3 A representation of
the Ockhamistic/Molinistic
model in terms of Prior’s
notion of branching time
Now
indicating the theories of truth-makers and grounding should be rejected. (See Craig
2001, Merricks 2007, 146 ff.)
Using Prior’s notion of branching time it might be extended and represented by a
diagram such as the following where the idea of the true future (including the idea of
‘middle knowledge’) is indicated by the use of arrows showing the true or selected
courses of events (Fig. 3).
The wisdom obtained from the critical points made by Belnap and Green suggests
that a Thin Red Line theory based on a single designated line will be insufficient.
If such a theory is possible, it has to include a unique true future at any point in the
model although there may be several possible futures at each point in the model. The
conclusion is that in the search for a Thin Red Line theory, one should look for a
theory based on a TRL-function from temporal moments to histories in the model.
We shall call such a theory “a TRL theory”.
3 An Obvious Requirement Regarding Iterative Tenses Makes
TRL Theories Problematic
Belnap and Green (1994) have argued that any serious TRL theory should imply the
validity of the following fundamental relation regarding iterative tenses.
(T1)P Pq ⊃ Pq
(T2)F Fq ⊃ Fq
From an intuitive point of view the validity of (T1-2) appears to be rather obvious.
T1 says that if it was that it was that q, then it was that q, etc. This understanding
of the iterated tenses seems straight forward given the way the tenses are used in
natural language and in common sense reasoning. In a similar way, several other
basic expressions have to come out as valid in general, if the theory in question is to
be accepted. One other obvious proposition which should be valid in general is
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(M1)Fq ⊃ ♦Fq
If it will be that q, then it is possible that it will be that q. There can be no doubt
that William of Ockham would have understood this type of requirement. After all,
he also wanted to formulate a logical theory in accordance with natural language and
common sense reasoning.
In their 1994 paper Belnap and Green suggested that the TRL-function in a TRL
theory in order to lead to the general validity of expressions like (T1-2) and (M1)
satisfy the following conditions:
(TRL1) m ∈ T RL(m)
(TRL2) m1 < m2 ⊃ T RL(m1) = T RL(m2)
However, as Belnap and Green have correctly pointed out the acceptance of the
combination of (TRL1) and (TRL2) entails a rejection of the very idea of branching
time. The reason is that if (TRL1) and (TRL2) are both accepted, it follows from
m1 < m2 that m2 ∈ T RL(m1), i.e. that all moments of time after m1 would have
to belong to the thin red line through m1, which means that there will in fact be no
branching at all.
This seems to give rise to a problem for the TRL theory. However, it turns out that
there is in fact no need to accept (TRL2), which seems to be too strong a requirement.
Rather than (TRL2), the weaker condition (TRL2′) can be employed:
(TRL2′)(m1 < m2 ∧ m2 ∈ T RL(m1)) ⊃ T RL(m1) = T RL(m2)
This weaker requirement appears to be much more natural in relation to the basic
idea of TRL-theory. Belnap has later accepted that (TRL2′) is a relevant alternative
to (TRL2) ([Personal correspondence, 1 Aug. 1996] and Belnap et al. 2001, p. 169).
Following Prior’s ideas in Postulate Sets for Tense Logic extended to a TRL-model
we can formulate the following truth condition for the future operator:
(i) Fq is true a moment m iff there is a moment of time, m′ ∈ T RL(m), such that
m < m′ and q is true at m′.
In the same way it is possible to define what it means for a proposition, Pq, to be
true at the moment m, taking TRL(m) as the designated line.
Given these truth conditions it is easily seen that (T1-2) are valid in general. In
addition (M1) will be valid in general, if we accept the following truth condition:
(ii) ♦Fq is true a moment m iff there is a moment of time, m′, and a chronicle, c,
such that m ∈ c, m′ ∈ c, m < m′ and q is true at m′.
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4 TRL Theories Lead to Problematic Evaluations
at Counterfactual Moments of Time
Belnap and Green (1994) have argued that in addition to (T1-2) any serious TRL
theory should imply the general validity of expressions like
(T3) q ⊃ P(x)F(x)q
where P(x) stands for “it was the case x time units ago” and F(x) stands for “it is going
to be the case in x time units”. (T3) should be true not only at moments belonging
to the history which is actually taking place, but also at counterfactual moments.
Again, following a tradition from medieval logic, it seems reasonable to require
that statements like (T3) are true even at counterfactual moments of time. Logicians
like William of Ockham would be very likely to have accepted that (T3) should be
valid in general.
However, this will be difficult to maintain (T3) as valid within a TRL-theory if we
assume a rigorous notion of compositionality for the evaluation of truth values. Con-










Given this TRL model we may ask whether q ⊃ P(x)F(x)q is true at m2. As indi-
cated above q is true at m2. However, assuming a rigorous notion of compositionality
P(x)F(x)q is false at m2, since F(x)q appears to false at m3.
However, alternatively one may insist that any evaluation of a truth value at mo-
ment of time, m, should be carried out as if TRL(m) were the designated line (“The
Thin Red Line”). This means that truth of a position, p, at a moment of time, m, may
simply be defined in term of the truth-function in Prior’s Ockhamistic system in the
following way:
trueT(p, m) = Ock(m, T RL(m), p)
If this is accepted no iteration of the tense operators, P and F, will get us off the
designated chronicle when calculating the truth value of a proposition at m. Using
this approach to the evaluation of counterfactual truth-values, we will in the above
case find that the implication, q⊃P(x)F(x)q, is in fact true at m2. This is so, because
the evaluation is carried out only referring to T RL(m2).
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Taking this rather simple approach we end up with a logical system with exactly
the same theorems as in Priorean Ockhamism, including (T3). This is what we might
call the simple Ockhamistic answer to the Belnap-Green challenge.
However, it might be objected that if we were to assume a designated chronicle
as a background for the evaluation of the truth-value of a tense-logical proposition it
ought to be T RL(m1) (i.e. the actual history) and not an alternative history such as
T RL(m2). This objection appears to be based on the view, that any counterfactual
statement in principle has made as seen from the actual world. When we are claiming
that something like (T3) might be true even at a counterfactual moment of time, m2,
what we mean is that at the present moment of time, m1, it is true for any numbers
x and y that
P(y)♦F(y)(q ⊃ P(x)F(x)q)
In fact, the claim that (T3) holds in general, means that the implication mentioned
in (T3) would have been true no matter what had happened in the past i.e. even if
alternative past possibilities had been actualized. This means that at the present time,
m1, the following is true for arbitrary positive numbers z, y and x:
P(z)F(y)(q ⊃ P(x)F(x)q)
According to this approach, we suggest that the truth-value of a tense-logical
expression at a moment of time, m, should be evaluated as in Prior’s paper mentioned
above using the branching time and taking TRL(m) to be the designated (red) line. In
order to deal with the modal operators in a precise manner, we need a truth condition
for the modal operators which more general than (ii) in Sect. 3. We may consider the
following Ockhamistic truth condition:
(iii) ♦p is true at the moment of time, m, relative to a chronicle c iff there is a
chronicle, c′, through m, such that p is true at m relative to a c′, which is
understood as the chronicle that should be used in the further evaluation.
However, it may be objected that in such a model the TRL-function has really no
role to play in the semantics, in the sense that the properties of the TRL-function does
not influence which propositions are valid in general and which are invalid. However,
as pointed out in Braüner et al. (2000), Øhrstrøm (2009), it is in fact possible to create
an alternative system, in which the TRL-function plays such a role. This may be done
using the following Ockhamistic truth condition:
(iv) ♦p is true at the moment of time, m, relative to a chronicle, c, iff there is a
chronicle, c′, belonging to CT (m), such that p is true at m relative to a c′, which
is understood as the chronicle that should be used in the further evaluation,
where
CT (m) = {c|m ∈ c & T RL(m′) = c, for any m′ ∈ c with m < m′}
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Note that C(m) is a subset of all chronicles through m. With this definition any
history used in evaluation of the proposition ♦p at a moment m, can be conceived
as a T RL(m′), where m′ is a moment immediately after m.
As argued in Braüner et al. (2000), Øhrstrøm (2009) this alternative defini-
tion leads to a slightly different semantics, according which e.g. the proposition,
F(x)♦F(y)p ⊃ ♦F(y)F(y)p, will not be valid in general. This means that in this
system something which is not yet possible may become possible, i.e. new possibil-
ities may turn up! However, it should be emphasized there is not absolute need to go
for a system like this, but the existence of this alternative system at least shows that
simple TRL-system mentioned above it not the only possible and that it is possible
to define a semantic system in which the TRL-function plays a significant role in the
semantics.
Conclusion
As argued above, it is possible to respond to the Belnap-Green challenge in a rea-
sonable manner. One solution is the simple Ockhamistic answer. A slightly more
sophisticated solution has been suggested in Braüner et al. (2000). There are other
interesting solutions such as the one suggested by Malpass and Wawer (2012), where
there is a single designated line and a supervaluational account of counterfactual fu-
ture contingents is given.
Playing with a title of Dummett (The logical basis of metaphysics, 1991), Nuel
Belnap wrote:
If you wish to learn the “metaphysical basis of logic” according to some logician, studying
the inductive account of the language is useful, but it is crucial to understand his or her
explanations of the parameters that are at bottom of the entire enterprise (Belnap 2007, p. 97).
No doubt, William of Ockham would have agreed. He wanted to study the tenses as
they are used in natural language and in common sense reasoning. But he certainly
wanted to do so based on what he believed to be the fundamental features of our
world. A very important feature of the world according to Ockham’s view is that
exactly one of the many possible ways, in which the world may develop, is the
true one. He would insist that we have to develop our logical theories taking this
important fact into account. And even more important we have to carry out this task
in a logically consistent manner. For this reason William of Ockham would clearly
also have appreciated the challenges formulated by Nuel Belnap and his co-workers,
since these thoughtful comments have been a great help to anyone who wants to
establish a consistent theory of what Belnap and Green have called “the thin red
line”.
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